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A key challenge in Web services security is the design of effective access control schemes that can 
adequately meet the unique security challenges posed by the Web services paradigm. Despite the recent 
advances in Web based access control approaches applicable to Web services, there remain issues that 
impede the development of effective access control models for Web services environment. Amongst them 
are the lack of context-aware models for access control, and reliance on identity or capability-based access 
control schemes. In this paper, we motivate the design of an access control scheme that addresses these 
issues, and propose an extended, trust-enhanced version of our XML-based Role Based Access Control (X-
RBAC) framework that incorporates context-based access control. We outline the configuration mechanism 
needed to apply our model to the Web services environment, and also describe the implementation 
architecture for the system. 
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1. Introduction 
Security in Web services is critical to their wide-scale adoption and integration in Web-
based enterprise systems and softwares. The present day Web is abound with examples of 
Web-based enterprise services, and there is an increasing trend amongst them to migrate 
to the Web services platform in order to enhance and diversify the online services 
provided to their customers. While shifting from the traditional client-server architecture 
to Web services technology is seen as an endorsement of the Internet community’s faith 
in the promise of the Web services paradigm, the goals of interoperability and ubiquity as 
envisioned by the Web services technology can only reasonably be realized if the unique 
security challenges posed by this paradigm are appropriately addressed. Among these 
challenges is to develop models for effective access control in dynamic XML-based Web 
services. The uniqueness here comes from the fact that the Web-based enterprise 
resources being exposed via Web services are typically dynamic and distributed in 
nature, and hence require adaptive access control models that can capture the 
dynamically changing security requirements of the target enterprise.  
 
The mechanisms required to effectively enforce access control across distributed, 
heterogeneous domains are becoming increasingly complex. This complexity arises not 
only because of the sheer size of the distributed clientele accessing online services but 
also because of the fact that access control model should capture security-relevant 
contextual information, such as time, location, or environmental state available at the 
time the access requests are made, and incorporate it in its access control decisions. These 
context parameters capture the dynamically changing access requirements in a Web-
based enterprise, and hence are critical to the effectiveness of the resulting access control 
scheme. The context directly affects the level of trust associated with a user, and hence 
the authorizations granted to him/her. These parameters constitute what is generally 
termed as a “user profile”. The access privileges of requestors to an online service 
provider could be based on certain thresholds as established by the System Security 
Officer (SSO) based on the requestor’s access patterns. If at any time, a requestor appears to deviate from his/her usual profile, the thresholds (i.e. the trust level) would 
automatically be reduced as a precaution to prevent a potential abuse of privileges. This 
is a real-time requirement, and is exceedingly important in dynamic Web services serving 
millions of customers with diverse activity profiles. In order for the access control to be 
effectively exercised in such scenarios with context-sensitive access requirements, the 
traditional access control models must be extended to make them context-aware. To this 
end, we propose to employ the generalized temporal extension to our X-RBAC [X-
RBAC] model, the XML-based Generalized Temporal Role Based Access Control (X-
GTRBAC) model [X-GTRBAC]. X-GTRBAC was originally proposed as a solution to 
enterprise-wide access control, but due to its XML-based framework, it can also be 
configured to provide access control in Web services. In Section 3, we introduce the 
reader to the X-GTRBAC model and outline the mechanism to extend X-GTRBAC as a 
context-aware access control framework for Web services environment. 
 
Another issue we highlight in the paper is trust-based role assignment to users. There are 
different (although related) notions of “trust” in the literature.  The one that is relevant to 
our purposes is the level of confidence associated with a user based on certain certified 
attributes thereof. In our framework, this level of confidence is not quantitatively 
reported. Instead, we rely on the Trust Management (TM) approach of trusted third 
parties (such as any PKI CA
1), and use the certification provided by them to assign roles 
to users. We derive our motivation for doing that from the review of traditional access 
control schemes that have adopted either an identity or capability-based approach to 
authorize users [Author-X thru XACL]. Such mechanisms do not scale well to the 
distributed Web services architecture, and hence would cause a significant burden to be 
attached to the enforcement of the access control scheme. This is because each credential 
needs an explicit delegation act by the respective domain administrators. In order to 
overcome this limitation, we outline a mechanism to incorporate trust in X-GTRBAC 
model in Section 3. In particular, we would use TM credentials (i.e. certificates) to allow 
trust establishment amongst distributed domains.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We begin by providing a 
compendium of related work in the area of Web services security, and discuss how our 
framework aligns with the existing security architectures. We also review the features 
provided by existing Web-based access control schemes, and their suitability to Web 
services. We next introduce our trust-based context-aware access control model, which is 
based on a temporal extension of X-RBAC with trust domains incorporated into it. The 
paper concludes with the discussion of implementation architecture of our model and an 
overview of future research goals. 
 
2. Background and Related Work 
We shall now provide a background and compendium of current state of the art in Web 
services security. A fair amount of related research in this area is due to the industry, with 
standards such as Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [SAML] and eXtensible 
Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [XACML] being recently adopted. SAML 
defines an XML framework for exchanging authentication and authorization information 
                                                 
1 Public Key Encryption Certification Authority for securing Web services, and relies on third-party authorities for provision of 
“assertions” containing such information. XACML is an XML framework for specifying 
access control policies for Web-based resources, and with significant extensions can 
potentially be applied to secure Web services. The XACML specification supports 
identity-based access control and incorporates some contextual information, such as 
location and time, into access decisions, without any formal context-aware access control 
model. There also are other emerging specifications, most notable amongst them are the 
ones outlined in WS security roadmap [WS Roadmap]. The road map consists of a bunch 
of component specifications, the core amongst them are WS-Security, WS-Policy, and 
WS-Trust. WS-Security is similar in intent and purpose to SAML, only uses a different 
technology. WS-Policy is used to describe the security policies in terms of their 
characteristics and supported features (such as required “security tokens”, encryption 
algorithms, privacy rules, etc.). WS-Trust defines a trust model that allows for exchange 
of such security tokens (using mechanisms provided by WS-Security) in order to enable 
the issuance and dissemination of credentials within different trust domains, and establish 
online trust relationships. The models proposed in the roadmap have been directed 
primarily at authentication aspect of Web services security, with an emphasis on 
designing secure messaging protocols to communicate the security-relevant information, 
such as security tokens and characteristics of security policy. The specification leaves 
room for custom authorization models to be tied in to the architecture at the appropriate 
(i.e. WS-Policy) level. In this paper, we intend to present an access control model that is 
capable of doing exactly that; our XML-based framework allows easy integration into the 
existing XML-based architectures for Web services security, while providing an effective 
authorization mechanism suitable for Web services environment.  
 
There has been an effort in the research community to highlight the challenges in Web-
based access control within the XML framework, including both the initial DTD-based 
solutions [Bertino, Damiani, Vuong, XACL], and the more recent schema-based 
approaches [X-RBAC, Sandhu]. In [X-RBAC], we have presented X-RBAC, an XML-
based RBAC policy specification framework for enforcing access control in dynamic 
XML-based Web services. X-RBAC was designed to readily integrate within the XML 
framework, and emphasized simple, yet effective, administration through the use of 
RBAC. We also maintained that X-RBAC includes a comprehensive set of features that 
is comparable to the related access control schemes cited above, and is targeted for the 
Web services environment. Although X-RBAC and related schemes provide viable 
solutions, there remain issues that impede the development of effective access control 
models for Web services environment. Amongst them are the lack of context-aware 
models for access control, and reliance on identity or capability-based access control 
schemes. We next elaborate upon these issues, and propose an extended and trust-
enhanced version of our X-RBAC model in an attempt to address them. 
 
3. Trust–Enhanced X-GTRBAC Model 
This section begins with an introduction to the X-GTRBAC model. It then describes the 
mechanism to configure X-GTRBAC to provide context-aware trust-based access control 
in Web services.  
 3.1 X-GTRBAC- An Introduction 
The X-GTRBAC framework is based on Generalized Temporal Role Based Access 
Control (GTRBAC) model [GTRBAC]. X-GTRBAC augments GTRBAC with XML to 
allow for supporting the policy enforcement in a heterogeneous, distributed environment. 
GTRBAC extends the widely accepted Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model 
proposed in the NIST RBAC standard [NIST_RBAC]. RBAC uses the concept of roles to 
embody a collection of permissions within an organizational setup. Permissions are 
associated with roles through a permission-to-role assignment, and the users are granted 
access to resources through a user-to-role assignment [RBAC96]. GTRBAC provides a 
generalized mechanism to express a diverse set of fine-grained temporal constraints on 
user-to-role and permission-to-role assignments in order to meet the dynamic access 
control requirements of an enterprise. X-GTRBAC allows specification of all the 
elements of the GTRBAC model. These specifications are captured through a context-
free grammar called X-Grammar, which follows the same notion of terminals and non-
terminals as in BNF, but supports the tagging notation of XML that also allows 
expressing attributes within element tags. The detailed specification of these elements of 
X-GTRBAC framework can be found in [X-GTRBAC]. Table 1 below enlists the salient 
features of the model. 
 
  
Table 1. Salient Features of X-GTRBAC 
  
Element Type    Element Name  Purpose 
XML User Sheet (XUS)  Declares the users and their authorization 
credentials 
XML Role Sheet (XRS)  Declares the roles, their attributes, role hierarchy, 
and any separation of duty and temporal constraints 
associated with roles 
RBAC Element 
XML Permission Sheet (XPS) Declares the available permissions 
XML User-to-Role Assignment 
Sheet (XURAS) 
Defines the rules for assignment of users to roles; 
these assignments may have associated temporal 
constraints 
RBAC 
Assignments 
XML Permission-to-Role 
Assignment Sheet (XPRAS) 
Defines the rules for assignment of permissions to 
roles; these assignments may have associated 
temporal constraints
RBAC 
Constraints 
XML Separation Of Duty 
Definition Sheet (XSoDDef) 
Defines the separation of duty constraints on roles 
XML Temporal Constraint 
Definition Sheet 
(XTempConstDef) 
Defines the temporal constraints on role enabling 
and activation; also defines temporal constraints for 
user-to-role and permission-to-role assignments 
GTRBAC 
Constraints 
 
XML Trigger Definition Sheet 
(XTrigDef) 
Defines context-based  triggers for invocation of 
periodic events subject to associated constraint 
evaluation 
Authorization 
Credentials 
XML Credential Type 
Definition Sheet 
(XCredTypeDef) 
Defines the available credential types 
 We now describe the mechanism to configure X-GTRBAC to provide context-aware 
trust-based access control in Web services. Toward that end, we need to outline a set of 
formal specifications to capture contextual information, and illustrate how it can be 
incorporated within the access control model. In addition, we would need to provide an 
interface to the system to accept TM credentials instead of its usual user credentials as the 
basis of privilege assignments. 
 
3.2 Context-aware access control 
This section defines the set of specifications needed to configure X-GTRBAC for 
context-aware access control in Web services environment. We base our set of 
specifications on a tuple language that can be readily mapped to our existing XML-based 
framework. In the following, we provide the formal definition of context, and then use 
that to provide the definition for a service_access_request. In order to formalize the 
context, we introduce a type system to allow specifying domains of legal values for 
various context parameters. Our formal model relies on the components we define below: 
 
Parameter Name Set: A set PN to denote the possible names of context parameters 
Parameter Type Set:  A set PT to denote the possible types of context parameters 
Context Parameter:   A context parameter is represented by a data structure p, having the 
following fields: name ∈ PN, type ∈ PT, and a function getValue(). 
Roles Set:  RR = {rr1, …. , rrk}, where rri , 1≤i≤k is a regular role in GTRBAC 
Operations Set: RO = {ro1, …. , rok}, where rok, 1≤i≤k is a regular operation in GTRBAC 
Service:   A service is an abstraction of the operations provided by the system on its 
resources. Formally, a service is a subset of the data set RO, and is designated by 
the service name srv that is defined per the wsdl:service element of the 
Web Services Description Language (WSDL) document 
Services Set:   SRVS = {srv1, …. , srv k}, where srvi , 1≤i≤k is a service. 
 
Definition 1: (Context): A context set C consists of n context parameters {p1, …. , pn}, n≥ 0, 
s.t. for any pi, pj, with i ≠ j and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, we have that pi.name ≠ pj.name (i.e. the 
parameter names must be distinct). 
 
We mention here that PN and PT constitute a set of pre-specified parameter names and 
types determined by the SSO. For example, the set PN may be defined as: PN 
={time_of_day, location, duration, system_load}, with the corresponding 
set  PT defined as: PT ={Time, String, Long, Integer}. The p.getValue() 
function is used to dynamically compute the value of the parameter, and its 
implementation is system-dependent. For built-in system parameters, such as 
time_of_day, it might just serve as a wrapper around system functions such as 
getCurrentTime(). The dynamic mechanism to compute parameter values especially helps 
in the case of mobile users accessing Web-based services, because in such environments 
the parameter values are constantly changing and may need to be re-evaluated at certain 
intervals. Additionally, for dynamic access constraints, such as duration, getValue() 
would be called periodically to ensure that the constraint is always satisfied. We also note 
from the preceding definition that the context may be an empty set. 
 Definition 2: (Service_access_request): A service access request is defined as a triple <role, 
srv, context> where role ∈ RR, srv ∈ SRVS, and context is defined according to 
Definition 1 and captured dynamically at the time of the access request.  
 
Based on the service_access_request, the system determines the applicable access policy 
for the requested service. This policy will be based on a set of constraints on the role and 
service name, and evaluated in conjunction with the available contextual information to 
enforce fine grained access control. An access policy consists of a collection of access 
conditions. In order to formulate an access condition, we refer to the notion of 
parameterized roles of [X-GTRBAC]. Parameterized roles are roles supplemented with 
role_attributes. The attributes set A of a role contains a collection of contextual attributes 
(such as time, location or system load) that may be used to define context-based 
conditions on roles. The values of these attributes are specified by the SSO, and these 
values are compared with the values of the supplied context parameters in order to 
evaluate an access request. The set of contextual attributes of a role is hence a subset of 
the set C of context parameters, and follows the same type system. We formally define 
the  access_policy below. We assume the existence of a function 
getAttributesSet(role), which returns the set A for a given role. 
 
Definition 3: (Access Policy): Let r  ∈  RR be a role, srv ∈ SRVS  be a service name 
denoting a service. The access policy AP for a (r, srv) pair is a set of clauses, where each clause 
is a Boolean combination of expressions. An expression is of the form <attr Ө val> where 
attr  is a role attribute s.t. attr  ∈ getAttributesSet(r),  val is the value of the 
parameter as specified by the SSO in order for role r to access the service srv, and Ө is any 
relational/comparison operator. 
 
It may be mentioned that we have intentionally kept our model generic enough, as it is 
unlikely for any one model to capture all types of contextual information and associated 
conditions that might arise in practice. But for most practical purposes, the sets PN, PT 
and role_attributes may be extended according to the system requirements in order to 
define access conditions based on appropriate context parameters.  
 
We now give the following set of algorithms to evaluate a service_access_request. 
 
Algorithm: ComputeAccess 
Input: role, srv, C    //C is context array 
Output: decision d  , d ∈ {YES, NO, PENDING, N/A} 
 
 1: CL[] = getClauses(role,srv) 
 2.  A[] = getAttributesSet(role) 
 3.  FOR i = 1 to length(CL) DO 
    clause = CL[i] 
        access = getDecision(clause,A,C) 
         IF access = false 
  return  NO 
4: IF access = true 
  return  YES 
Algorithm: getDecision 
Input: clause,A,C 
Output: result        //boolean   
 
 1. initizalize(result[]) 
 2. FOR i = 1 to size(clause) DO 
         expr = clause.getExpr(i) 
         result[i]=evaluateExpr(expr,A,C)     
 3. return computeResult(result[]) 
 Algorithm: EvaluateExpression 
Input: expr, A, C       
Output: result               //boolean 
  
1. name = expr.getAttrName() 
2. attr = getAttribute(A,name) 
3. result = checkCondition(attr, C) 
4.    return result 
Algorithm: checkCondition 
Input: attr, C 
Output: result           //boolean 
 
1.  p=match(C,attr) 
  IF p.getValue()Ө val 
           result = true   
     ELSE 
     result = false   
2.:  return result 
 
The ComputeAccess algorithm works as follows. In Step 1, the clauses corresponding 
to the (role,srv) pair are retrieved from the AP into a dynamic array CL. Step 2 
retrieves the attributes of the role into a dynamic array A. In Step 3, the algorithm loops 
over the array CL and calls the routine getDecision() for each of the clauses. Each 
clause has potentially multiple expressions, and so each expression is evaluated using the 
evaluateExpr() routine. For each expression, this routine retrieves the attribute from 
the attribute array A and then calls the routine checkCondition()  to evaluate the 
conditions corresponding to this role attribute. This routine loops over the set C of 
supplied context parameters and finds the matching context parameter for this role 
attribute by calling the match() routine, which internally compares the name and type of 
the two entities. Since the set A is a subset of set C, this search always results in a match. 
When a match is found, it compares their values according to the operator specified in the 
AP. If the condition is satisfied, a value of true is returned to getDecision. After the 
result for all access conditions within the clause has been computed, the getDecision 
routine then computes the overall result for the clause and returns it to ComputeAccess. 
If any of the clauses evaluates to false, a NO is returned as the output of the 
ComputeAccess algorithm, because the overall access decision is a conjunction of all 
individual clauses. Otherwise, after the loop terminates successfully over all the clauses, 
a YES is returned. Other decisions such as PENDING or N/A may also be returned by 
incorporating system-specific logic into the algorithm. 
 
As an illustration, consider the example of a recently launched initiative of a German 
insurance company [Example1]. The company leverages Web services technology to 
introduce online visitors to its services, and allows them to purchase insurance coverage 
through an entirely digital process. The evaluation of an online coverage request requires 
several kinds of personal information to be made available, and the same needs to persist 
in the company’s database for a subsequent evaluation of an insurance claim. At that 
point, however, the access to the customer’s resources should only be granted after 
establishing the fact that the requestor indeed is “the” genuine customer. For instance, 
assume that the following service_access_request is submitted for evaluation to the 
system: 
 
<role=priv_cust,  service_name=’review_claim”, context={p1{time,12PM}, 
p2{location,”WashDC”},p3{duration,0},p4{system_load,”low”}>.  
 
This request says that a user belonging to the priv_cust (privileged customer) role has 
requested to review an online insurance claim through the Web-based review_claim 
service offered by the company. The context recorded at the time of access request is provided to the system as part of the request. Note that duration is initialized to 0 
because the access has not yet started. Now, assume that the following AP is applicable to 
the given (role, srv) pair:  
{ < CL1> , < CL2 >, < CL3> , < CL4 > } 
s.t. 
CL1: {time > 9AM} AND {time < 5PM) 
CL2: {location = WashDC} OR {location = NewYork}  
CL3: {system_load != “high”> 
CL4: {duration ≤ 600s} 
Based on this information, the system would return an authorization decision for this 
service_access_request. The available contextual information indicates that the access 
conditions are satisfied. In addition, due to the duration constraint specified for the 
requested service and enforced by the dynamic temporal constraint mechanism of 
GTRBAC, the access duration of the user is continuously monitored, and any violation 
thereof is detected on a per-user basis by the GTRBAC Processor (see Figure 1). The 
mechanism to deal with the violation is system-specific, but GTRBAC allows a trigger 
mechanism to take immediate actions in such situations (such as de-activating the role for 
the given user). Detailed discussion on such mechanisms can be found in [X-GTRBAC]. 
 
3.3 Incorporating trust domains 
In this section, we briefly describe a mechanism to incorporate trust domains in X-
GTRBAC to enable effective access control in a distributed environment, where user 
identities are not known a-priori. Since X-GTRBAC makes the access decisions based on 
the eligible roles for known users, we can use TM credentials to assign roles to users. 
While it is sometimes viewed as appropriate in TM to adopt a direct authorization model, 
i.e. to combine authentication and access control into one authorization step [Bla99a], we 
would like to motivate here that the indirection through roles helps scalability and 
flexibility in the case of large scale open systems, especially Web services. Hence, a 
significant advantage that accompanies the role-based approach adopted in our 
framework is that of simplified authorization administration [RBAC96]. An earlier 
approach that merged features from TM and RBAC, called the Role based Trust 
management framework (RT), was reported in [Li02a]. However, our primary goals are 
different from RT. The latter is primarily a TM credential exchange and distribution 
mechanism to assist authorizations in a distributed environment; it does not support an 
elaborate access control scheme beyond the basic permission-to-role assignment 
mechanism in RBAC. We focus on providing a context-aware access control model for 
the Web services environment, and rely on TM credentials for determining the trust level 
(i.e. role) associated with a user. As mentioned in the introduction, the trust level can be 
subsequently adjusted based on the user’s activity profile. Such a profile can be 
maintained by logging the contextual information associated with the invocation and 
acceptance of a service_access_request. 
 
The use of TM credentials to establish role memberships of users requires the X-
GTRBAC model to be adapted to accept distributed TM credentials. We touch upon the 
mechanisms needed to do this in the next section, but leave an elaborate treatment of the 
same for some future work, as it is not the focus of our current paper. It may be noted Figure 1: Context Aware X-GTRBAC System Architecture 
Policy  
Loader 
Policy  
Validation 
Module
X-GTRBAC Module
GTRBAC  
Module 
UR ,PR DataSet 
  TRIG DataSet 
Sessions
DataSet 
XML 
Sessions 
Log 
GTRBAC Processor XML Processor 
 
DOM
XML 
Parser 
XML/SOAP 
Authorization 
Data Item
Functional 
Module 
Legend: 
 
XML/SOAP 
Access 
Request 
Document 
Composition 
Module 
XML  
Policy 
Base 
Context 
Extractor 
here that the trust-based approach to verifying user credentials effectively adds 
authentication support to our existing authorization model. 
  
4. Implementation Architecture 
There is an on-going effort underway on extending our implementation prototype, first 
reported in [X-RBAC]. Figure 1 illustrates the architecture and design of the extended 
version of the X-GTRBAC prototype, incorporating context-aware access control.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The major system components depicted in the figure are summarized in Table 2. The 
existing prototype incorporates the temporal constraint enforcement mechanism as per 
the GTRBAC model. The generalization of the contextual information to include 
parameters other than time as described in the paper is being incorporated into the 
system. We are also working toward a set of specifications that would allow us to 
substitute the existing credential evaluation mechanism with that involving TM 
credentials. Because of the modular design of X-GTRBAC, this task can be accomplished 
with only slight modifications in the overall architecture. The components affected would 
be (i) the XML Policy Base, since it would now need to store a different XCredTypeDef 
sheet based on TM credentials, and (ii) the XML Processor, since it would now employ a 
different evaluation logic for processing credential declarations. Our set of specifications 
would be XML-based, and hence can be expected to integrate well with the existing 
framework. 
 
  
 
Table 2. Description of X-GTRBAC system modules 
 
 Module  Name  Description 
Document Composition Module (DCM)  Used to compose the policy documents; contains the  XML-
Policy Base that serves as the document repository; is an 
external component of the model 
Policy Loader  The interface of the system to the DCM; used to load the 
XML policy files into the system 
Policy Validation Module  Validates the XML policy files for existence checking and 
type conformance according to policy rules; XML syntax 
validation is also implicitly done 
XML processor  Contains an XML parser that generates the DOM tree 
representation of the XML policy files 
GTRBAC Processor  Contains a GTRBAC Module that translates the DOM tree 
representation to internal RBAC data structures representing 
the system state at any time; maintains logs of sessions and 
updates the system data structures to allow contextual 
information to be incorporated in access decisions 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have outlined a mechanism to develop a trust-based, context-aware 
access control model for Web services based on the X-GTRBAC framework. X-
GTRBAC is a temporal extension of the earlier X-RBAC model for access control in 
Web services. The mechanism presented in the paper extends X-GTRBAC to support 
context-aware access control based on both temporal and non-temporal contextual 
conditions. In addition, we outline a mechanism to incorporate trust domains into X-
GTRABC by the use of distributed TM credentials for unknown users. Such an approach 
effectively adds authentication support to our system. We have discussed the 
configuration of X-GTRBAC for its application in Web services environments, and also 
proposed extensions to our current implementation architecture for the purposes outlined 
in this paper. We intend to report the detailed results of our on-going implementation 
efforts in some future work. We also plan to explore a mechanism to allow specification 
of certain role attributes whose values are not known a-priori, and may be dynamically 
computed based on runtime information. This scheme is particularly useful where the 
same role may have a different set of associated privileges depending on the value of the 
role attributes. Another future direction of research would be to investigate the suitability 
of the proposed administration model for X-GTRBAC [X-GTRBAC-Admin] to Web 
services. We expect to see our framework evolve with time, as Web services standards 
are continually being enhanced, and would likely incorporate additional security 
mechanisms, such as secure messaging and transaction support, into our system 
leveraging the power of existing and emerging Web services specifications. 
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